It is well-known that Choice and Regularity are independent of each other but have important common consequences of logical character (reflection principles, representations of classes by sets, etc.). In my talk, I shall try:
(A) To explain this phenomenon,
(B) To consider relationships between these consequences (and near principles) in detail,
and besides, (C) To consider some arguments related to truth of various principles in set theory .
All theorems can be proved in ZF, the ZermeloFränkel set theory, minus Regularity (quite often in some its fragments).
The Axiom of Choice, AC. For any set there is a choice function on it.
There are a number of equivalent principles, the most famous are perhaps Zorn's Lemma (Kuratowski) and
The Well-Ordering Principle, WO. For any set there is a well-ordering on it.
Theorem (Zermelo). AC is equivalent to WO.
AC has a deep impact on the universe of set theory by giving as nice consequences, e.g.,
All cardinals form a well-ordered hierarchy
as well as ugly ones, e.g.,
The Banach-Tarski Paradox.
The Axiom of Regularity, AR. Any nonempty set has an ∈-minimal element.
A set is well-founded iff ∈ is well-founded on its transitive closure. Then AR is equivalent to the sentence:
All sets are well-founded (and another name of AR is the Axiom of Foundation).
To formulate an equivalent principle, recall the cumulative hierarchy of sets:
Theorem (von Neumann). AR is equivalent to
If R ⊆ X × X is well-founded, we have:
i.e., a strong homomorphism stratifying X into levels X α :
which is a strong homomorphism allowing to get Theorem (The Mostowski Collapsing Lemma).
Any extensional well-founded relation is isomorphic to a unique transitive one (and a unique possible isomorphism is its transitive collapse).
So, AR has mainly a "simplifying" character: we can use all these nice properties.
Quite often principles have local and global forms. Typically, a local/global principle says about sets/classes or one formula/all formulas. Global versions of the previous principles:
The Global Choice, GC. There is a choice function on the universe.
The Global Well-Ordering, GWO. There is a well-ordering of the universe.
The Global Regularity, GR. Any nonempty class has an ∈-minimal element.
(GR is a schema. To formulate GC, we add a new functional symbol. For GWO, we add a new predicate symbol.)
(The only hard clause is (4). Later I shall show that one can sharp (5) by replacing "implies" with "is equivalent to" and AR with a weaker principle BF.)
To complete this account, note that Choice plus Regularity together can be formulated in a single way:
The Choice of Minimals, ACM. For any set X there is a choice function
The Global Choice of Minimals, GCM.
There is a choice function C on V such that C(x) ∩ x = ∅ for all nonempty sets x.
Clearly,

Lemma.
1. ACM is equivalent to AC + AR.
GCM is equivalent to GC + AR.
To explicate why Choice (mainly in the strongest form GWO) and Regularity have common consequences, I isolate their "intersection": a principle (called here Best-Foundedness) which is consistent with negations of both axioms but implies all these consequences.
Let me say that a well-founded relation E is best-founded iff {x : rk E (x) = α} is a set for every ordinal α.
By Replacement, then U α = {x : rk E (x) < α} is also a set for every α.
Examples. The empty relation on a proper class is well-but not best-founded. ∈ is bestfounded on transitive well-founded sets, and so (by the Mostowski theorem) all extensional well-founded relations are best-founded.
The Best-Foundedness Axiom, BF. There is a best-founded relation on V .
(The axiom is in the language with a new predicate symbol.)
The principle has a number of reformulations (in appropriate languages). Define:
A is club iff it is ⊆-cofinal in V and for any
A is a basis iff {P α (x) :
Example. AR is equivalent to any of (1) and (2):
Under BF the sets U α play much the same part as the sets V α under AR. E.g., {U α : α ∈ Ord} is club.
Moreover,
Lemma. BF is equivalent to any of (1)- (4) Clause (2) gives a visual notion about BF: intuitively, ordinals of a model show its "height"; then a model witnessing BF is "stretched upward" while a model refuting BF is "inflated in width".
A similarity: GWO well-orders the whole universe while BF well-orders some its "essential" part (a basis or a club). Moreover, this can be maked in a natural way:
Lemma. If there is a well-orderable class that is club (or a basis), then there is such a class which is moreover ∈-and ⊆-well-ordered.
There are less obvious reformulations of BF, one of which (concerning the ordinal definability) I shall give a bit later.
Finally, BF is exactly what is missing in GC to be GWO:
Theorem. GC + BF is equivalent to GWO.
(Cf. with (5) of Lemma above.)
Consequences
Showing that BF works, I shall consider following its consequences:
The existence of Skolem and Scott functions, The reflection of formulas at sets, The expressibility of the ordinal definability, The representability of equivalence classes by sets, and relationships between them.
Let ϕ(u, . . . , x) be a formula with the parameters u, . . . , x.
A function A ϕ is a Skolem function for ϕ iff
Similarly, let me say that a function B ϕ is a Scott function for ϕ iff (∃x) ϕ(u, . . . , x) → (∃x ∈ B ϕ (u, . . .)) ϕ(u, . . . , x) and (∀x ∈ B ϕ (u, . . .)) ϕ(u, . . . , x).
Thus A ϕ chooses a single point from the class {x : ϕ(u, . . . , x)}:
while B ϕ separates from this class its subset
such that the set B ϕ (u, . . .) is nonempty whenever the class {x : ϕ(u, . . . , x)} so is.
Remark. Scott was probably first who noted that such functions can be used instead of Skolem functions in absence of AC.
Consider the following schemas (in extended languages):
The Skolem Principle, Sk. A class M reflects a formula ϕ(x, . . .) iff for all
The Reflection Principle, RP. Each formula is reflected at some set.
(RP is a schema, RP ϕ are instances.)
It follows from RP that each true formula has a set model.
Of course, the principle holds for finitely many formulas as well. Let me rewrite it as follows: If Γ is a finite set of formulas, then there is a set M such that
Thus RP is a local variant of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. But unlike it, RP can be proved inside (some) set theory:
Theorem. Sc implies RP.
(Take a Scott hull.)
Moreover, Sc gives a club class of reflecting sets, and BF gives a club class of reflecting sets of form U α .
Remarks. 1. Without Choice, we know nothing about the size of submodels. 2. The full Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem (without an evaluation of the cardinality) can be obtained in the same way as a metatheorem.
We consider two applications of Reflection. The first concerns the finite axiomatizability:
Let us call a theory sufficiently rich iff it admits a coding. (E.g., ZF minus Infinity so is).
Proposition. Let T be sufficiently rich consistent theory and T ⊢ RP. Then T is not finitely axiomatizable.
(Apply the Second Incompleteness Theorem.)
Examples. The theory consisting of Union, Power Set, Replacement, and Best-Foundedness is not finitely axiomatizable. The same for any its consistent extension (e.g., ZF). On the other hand, in the Zermelo set theory Z (which is finitely axiomatizable), RP is not provable.
Another application of RP: the description of ordinal-definable sets inside of set theory.
A class is ordinal-definable iff it is of the form {u : ϕ(u, α, . . .)} for some formula ϕ where all α, . . . are ordinals. OD is the class of all ordinaldefinable sets. cl is the closure under Gödel operations.
A well-known fact: AR implies
It follows that OD is well-orderable and club (and moreover, the largest inner model of ZF with a global well-ordering definable via ∈).
We sharp:
Theorem. BF implies OD = cl ({U α : α ∈ Ord}).
(Use RP to prove ⊆.)
Corollary. BF holds iff OD is well-orderable and club.
Thus again (like the characteristic of GWO via BF and GC) we sharp an old result of form Γ + AR implies ∆ by a new result of form Γ + BF is equivalent to ∆ (where Γ and ∆ are some sets of formulas). This supports a naturality of BF.
As the last interesting consequence of BF, consider representations of equivalence classes by sets.
Let ϕ(x, y) define an equivalence:
ϕ(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y, z) → ϕ(y, x) ∧ ϕ(x, z).
A function F ϕ represents the equivalence defined by ϕ iff ϕ(x, y) ↔ F ϕ (x) = F ϕ (y).
The Representation of Classes Principle, RC. For any equivalence formula there is a representing function.
